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dc.contributor.authorKerber, Wolfgangen
dc.contributor.authorKretschmer, Jürgen-Peteren
dc.contributor.authorvon Wangenheim, Georgen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-12-
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05T15:38:24Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-05T15:38:24Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30079-
dc.description.abstractAlthough both in US antitrust and European competition law there is a clear evolution to a much broader application of rule of reason (instead of per-se rules), there is also an increasing awareness of the problems of a case-by-case approach. The error costs approach (minimizing the sum of welfare costs of decision errors and administrative costs) allows not only to decide between these two extremes, but also to design optimally differentiated rules (with an optimal depth of investigation) as intermediate solutions between simple per-se rules and a fullscale rule of reason. In this paper we present a decision-theoretic model that can be used as an instrument for deriving optimal rules for a sequential investigation process in competition law. Such a sequential investigation can be interpreted as a step-by-step sorting process into ever smaller subclasses of cases that help to discriminate better between pro- and anticompetitive cases. We analyze both the problem of optimal stopping of the investigation and optimal sequencing of the assessment criteria in an investigation. To illustrate, we show how a more differentiated rule on resale price maintenance could be derived after the rejection of its per-se prohibition by the US Supreme Court in the Leegin case 2007.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aPhilipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics |cMarburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x2008,16en
dc.subject.jelK20en
dc.subject.jelK21en
dc.subject.jelK40en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordLaw Enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordDecision-Makingen
dc.subject.keywordCompetition Lawen
dc.subject.keywordAntitrust Lawen
dc.titleOptimal sequential investigation rules in competition law-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn60663424Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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