EconStor >
Philipps-Universität Marburg >
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg >
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30079
  
Title:Optimal sequential investigation rules in competition law PDF Logo
Authors:Kerber, Wolfgang
Kretschmer, Jürgen-Peter
von Wangenheim, Georg
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Joint discussion paper series in economics 2008,16
Abstract:Although both in US antitrust and European competition law there is a clear evolution to a much broader application of rule of reason (instead of per-se rules), there is also an increasing awareness of the problems of a case-by-case approach. The error costs approach (minimizing the sum of welfare costs of decision errors and administrative costs) allows not only to decide between these two extremes, but also to design optimally differentiated rules (with an optimal depth of investigation) as intermediate solutions between simple per-se rules and a fullscale rule of reason. In this paper we present a decision-theoretic model that can be used as an instrument for deriving optimal rules for a sequential investigation process in competition law. Such a sequential investigation can be interpreted as a step-by-step sorting process into ever smaller subclasses of cases that help to discriminate better between pro- and anticompetitive cases. We analyze both the problem of optimal stopping of the investigation and optimal sequencing of the assessment criteria in an investigation. To illustrate, we show how a more differentiated rule on resale price maintenance could be derived after the rejection of its per-se prohibition by the US Supreme Court in the Leegin case 2007.
Subjects:Law Enforcement
Decision-Making
Competition Law
Antitrust Law
JEL:K20
K21
K40
D81
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
60663424X.pdf233.13 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30079

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.