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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2010-7
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
In the original framework of Professors Acemoglu and Robinson, the government is unable to oppress the revolution once it is brought about. However, actual civil wars are unpredictable. With this notion, I introduce uncertainty depending on military expenditures of the government. Then an interesting argument follows: if the likelihood of successful oppression is sufficiently larger than a certain level of destruction rate and there are cheap-but-effective devices such as biochemicals, citizens in a dictatorial country may have a trade-off between economic prosperity and domestic military threats.
Schlagwörter: 
Military expenditures
Acemoglu-Robinson model
war of attrition
JEL: 
C72
H56
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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