Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30022
Authors: 
Saito, Tetsuya
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Discussion Papers 2010-7
Abstract: 
In the original framework of Professors Acemoglu and Robinson, the government is unable to oppress the revolution once it is brought about. However, actual civil wars are unpredictable. With this notion, I introduce uncertainty depending on military expenditures of the government. Then an interesting argument follows: if the likelihood of successful oppression is sufficiently larger than a certain level of destruction rate and there are cheap-but-effective devices such as biochemicals, citizens in a dictatorial country may have a trade-off between economic prosperity and domestic military threats.
Subjects: 
Military expenditures
Acemoglu-Robinson model
war of attrition
JEL: 
C72
H56
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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