Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29557 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IWQW Discussion Papers No. 01/2008
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW), Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze a market game where firms choose capacities under uncertainty about future market conditions and make output choices after uncertainty has unraveled. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under imperfect competition and establish that capacity choices by strategic firms are generally too low from a welfare point of view. We also demonstrate that strategic firms choose even lower capacities if they anticipate competitive spot market pricing (e.g. due to regulatory intervention). We finally illustrate how the model can be used to assess the impact of electricity market liberalization on total capacity and welfare by fitting it to the data of the German electricity market.
Schlagwörter: 
Investment incentives
demand uncertainty
cost uncertainty
Cournot competition
First Best
Second Best
capacity obligations
spot market regulation
JEL: 
D43
L13
D41
D42
D81
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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