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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2009-36
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
The use of a taser by law enforcement can substitute for either a gun (a more-violent technology) or a mildly-violent technology (such as pepper spray or hands-on tactics). Which is used affects both the severity of harm when used and the amount of resistance, which affects how often it must be used. Thus, does the adoption of a less-violent technology lead to more or less violence? This question is addressed in an application to the adoption of tasers by law enforcement officials. A game-theoretic model is developed and environments where resistance to arrest and expected harm both increase and decrease are identified.
Schlagwörter: 
Law enforcement
less-violent technology
strategic offsetting behavior
JEL: 
K42
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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