Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27174 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorKoch, Lars P.en
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-10-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:41:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:41:03Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27174-
dc.description.abstractWe show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is asymptotically stable only if it represents a strict (correlated-)equilibrium set. There are correlated equilibria that cannot be represented by an asymptotically stable signal contingent strategy. For generic games it is shown that if signals are endogenous but no player has an incentive to manipulate the signal generating process and if the signal contingent strategy is asymptotically stable, then and only then, the outcome must be a strict Nash equilibrium.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x14/2008en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Stabilityen
dc.subject.keywordNoncooperative Gamesen
dc.subject.keywordCorrelated Equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordEvolutionen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwEvolutionsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEvolution and Correlated Equilibrium-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587686634en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:142008-

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
439.16 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.