Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27162 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 1/2008
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical agents are unlikely to reach even approximately their favorite water temperature. Heterogeneity allows some agents to reach much better temperatures, at the cost of higher risk.
Schlagwörter: 
coordination
heterogeneity
adaptive learning
non-linear system
feedback
JEL: 
C02
C61
C62
C63
D70
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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