Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27003
Authors: 
Munshi, Kaivan
Rosenzweig, Mark Richard
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center 964
Abstract: 
Parochial politics is typically associated with poor leadership and low levels of public good provision. This paper explores the possibility that community involvement in politics need not necessarily worsen governance and, indeed, can be efficiency-enhancing when the context is appropriate. Complementing the new literature on the role of community networks in solving market problems, we test the hypothesis that strong traditional social institutions can discipline the leaders they put forward, successfully substituting for secular political institutions when they are ineffective. Using new data on Indian local governments at the ward level over multiple terms, and exploiting the randomized election reservation system, we find that the presence of a numerically dominant sub-caste (caste equilibrium) is associated with the selection of leaders with superior observed characteristics and with greater public good provision. This improvement in leadership competence occurs without apparently diminishing leaders' responsiveness to their constituency.
Subjects: 
politics
commitment
governance
JEL: 
H11
H44
O12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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