Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26996 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Center Discussion Paper No. 957
Verlag: 
Yale University, Economic Growth Center, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are justified on efficiency grounds, the contract that optimally balances demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds, features a minimum revenue guarantee and a revenue cap. However, observed revenue guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements differ from those suggested by the optimal contract. Also, this contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements. Finally, the allocation of risk under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization.
Schlagwörter: 
Bundling
cost of public funds
demsetz auction
minimum revenue guarantees
privatization
revenue and profit caps
scope of government,
subsidies.
JEL: 
H21
H54
L51
R42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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