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Title:Cartels, managerial incentives, and productive efficiency in German coal mining, 1881-1913 PDF Logo
Authors:Burhop, Carsten
Lübbers, Thorsten
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008,13
Abstract:In this paper, we evaluate the impact of cartelisation and managerial incentives on the productive efficiency of German coal mining corporations. We focus on coal mining in the Ruhr district, Germany’s main mining area. We use stochastic frontier analysis and an unbalanced dynamic panel data set for up to 28 firms for the years 1881-1913 to measure productive efficiency. We show that coal was mined with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, it turns out that cartelisation did not affect productive efficiency. Controlling for corporate governance variables shows that stronger managerial incentives were significantly correlated with productive efficiency, whereas the debt-equity ratio did not influence it.
Subjects:Economic history
Germany pre-1913
Cartel
Productive efficiency
Corporate Governance
JEL:N53
L41
L71
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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