Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26664 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2619
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In a standard adverse selection world, asymmetric information about product quality leads to quality deterioration in the market. Suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely. Then, if consumers observe the investment (but not the realization of product quality) before purchase, they can infer the probability distribution of high and low quality that may be put on the market. We uncover two effects that may lead the firm to overinvest in quality compared to a market with full information: first, an adverse selection effect according to which a sufficiently large investment can avoid adverse selection and, second, an efficiency effect according to which a larger investment reduces the probability of socially inefficient, low quality products in the market.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric information
product quality
JEL: 
D82
D92
L15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
359.45 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.