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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen
dc.contributor.authorNosenzo, Danieleen
dc.contributor.authorRenner, Elkeen
dc.contributor.authorSefton, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-20-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:49:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:49:23Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26647-
dc.description.abstractWe report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2602en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary contributionsen
dc.subject.keywordsequential movesen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwSpendeen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleSequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: experimental evidence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn59782519Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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