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dc.contributor.authorBordignon, Massimoen
dc.contributor.authorTabellini, Guidoen
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-20-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:49:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:49:21Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26645-
dc.description.abstractWe compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2600en
dc.subject.jelH71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRun-offen
dc.subject.keywordmunicipal electionsen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordpropertyen
dc.subject.stwWahlen
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwRadikalismusen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwKommunalwahlen
dc.subject.stwItalienen
dc.titleModerating political extremism: single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn597824134en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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