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dc.contributor.authorKrasa, Stefanen
dc.contributor.authorPolborn, Mattiasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-04-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:48:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:48:51Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26605-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidates' characteristics and policies. Candidates' immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) are exogenously differentiated, while candidates can choose any policy for the remaining issues to maximize their winning probability. Voters have general preferences over the vectors of candidate characteristics and policies, and vote sincerely. Candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter preferences. We characterize a condition on voter preferences (satisfied in most existing models) under which candidates' equilibrium policies generically converge. In contrast, for voter preferences that violate this condition, we construct a class of models in which policy divergence arises in the unique and strict Nash equilibrium. As a normative criterion, we define competition-efficiency and provide conditions under which the equilibrium is or is not competition-efficient.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2560en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD60en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMultidimensional policyen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.keywordissue ownershipen
dc.subject.keywordnormative analysis of political competitionen
dc.subject.stwWahlkampfen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePolitical competition between differentiated candidates-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn592902293en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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