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dc.contributor.authorMatschke, Xeniaen
dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-02-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:48:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:48:34Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26581-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat of auditing and implementing penalty duties. We show that the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but may also help overcome the informational problems with regard to determining the optimal strategic trade policy.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2536en
dc.subject.jelF12en
dc.subject.jelF13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAntidumping dutiesen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordtrade protectionen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic trade policyen
dc.subject.stwAntidumpingen
dc.subject.stwStrategische Handelspolitiken
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwWTO-Regelnen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleAntidumping as strategic trade policy under asymmetric information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn592831612en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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