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dc.contributor.authorBouckaert, Janen
dc.contributor.authorDegryse, Hansen
dc.contributor.authorDijk, Theon vanen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-14-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:25Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:25Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26237-
dc.description.abstractCompetition authorities and regulatory agencies sometimes impose pricing restrictions on firms with substantial market power the dominant firms. We analyze the welfare effects of a ban on behaviour-based price discrimination in a two-period setting where the market displays a competitive and a sheltered segment. A ban on higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers decreases prices in the sheltered segment, relaxes competition in the competitive segment, increases the rival's profits, and may harm the dominant firm's profits. We show that a ban on higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers increases the dominant firm's share of the first-period market. A ban on lower-prices-to-rival's-customers decreases prices in the competitive segment, lowers the rival's profits, and augments the consumer surplus. In particular, while second-period competition is relaxed by a ban on lower-prices-to-rival's-customers , first-period competition is intensified substantially, which leads to lower prices on-average over the two periods. Our findings indicate that a dynamic two-period analysis may lead to conclusions opposite to those drawn from a static one-period analysis.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2192en
dc.subject.jelD11en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddominant firmsen
dc.subject.keywordprice discriminationen
dc.subject.keywordcompetition policyen
dc.subject.keywordregulationen
dc.subject.stwPreisdifferenzierungen
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten
dc.subject.stwPreisaufsichten
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen
dc.titlePrice discrimination bans on dominant firms-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558341187en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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