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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26237
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DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
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dc.contributor.author | Bouckaert, Jan | en |
dc.contributor.author | Degryse, Hans | en |
dc.contributor.author | Dijk, Theon van | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-02-14 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-28T08:29:25Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-28T08:29:25Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26237 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Competition authorities and regulatory agencies sometimes impose pricing restrictions on firms with substantial market power the dominant firms. We analyze the welfare effects of a ban on behaviour-based price discrimination in a two-period setting where the market displays a competitive and a sheltered segment. A ban on higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers decreases prices in the sheltered segment, relaxes competition in the competitive segment, increases the rival's profits, and may harm the dominant firm's profits. We show that a ban on higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers increases the dominant firm's share of the first-period market. A ban on lower-prices-to-rival's-customers decreases prices in the competitive segment, lowers the rival's profits, and augments the consumer surplus. In particular, while second-period competition is relaxed by a ban on lower-prices-to-rival's-customers , first-period competition is intensified substantially, which leads to lower prices on-average over the two periods. Our findings indicate that a dynamic two-period analysis may lead to conclusions opposite to those drawn from a static one-period analysis. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2192 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D11 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | dominant firms | en |
dc.subject.keyword | price discrimination | en |
dc.subject.keyword | competition policy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | regulation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Preisdifferenzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Marktmacht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Preisaufsicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerbstheorie | en |
dc.title | Price discrimination bans on dominant firms | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 558341187 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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