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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2069
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Politicians are disciplined through the electoral system. But this is often not enough to eliminate political rents. Economists suggest that competition across governments may also help. But intergovernmental competition can take two forms, through tax competition (exit) or yardstick competition (voice). We show these two forms may not, and in general do not, work in the same direction. Tax competition may reduce the screening properties of yardstick competition.
JEL: 
H7
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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