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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2045
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970-2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.
JEL: 
E5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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