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Title:Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job?: evidence based on a new data set PDF Logo
Authors:Dreher, Axel
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
de Haan, Jakob
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2045
Abstract:This paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970-2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.
JEL:E5
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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