Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26086 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2041
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.
JEL: 
D78
K31
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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