Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25942 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1897
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.
JEL: 
E52
E58
E61
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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