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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.contributor.authorPachl, Bernharden
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-10-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:41Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:41Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25917-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish the existence of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, using a suitable refinement concept. In any equilibrium, the first agent offers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in turn offers the whole cake back to the first agent. The third agent is then indifferent about dividing the cake between himself and the first or the second agent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1872en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD30en
dc.subject.jelD39en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleCake division by majority decision-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn528740288en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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