Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25913 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1868
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Within a two-country model with involuntary unemployment, this paper investigates corporate income taxation under separate accounting versus formula apportionment. In contrast to separate accounting, under formula apportionment the corporate tax policy causes a fiscal externality which goes back to unemployment. This unemployment externality is the lowest when the apportionment formula does not contain a payroll factor. It tends to compensate other externalities such that tax rates become inefficiently low. In an empirical calibration, we show that the transition from separate accounting to formula apportionment improves welfare and reduces unemployment. The welfare increase is the strongest under a pure sales formula.
JEL: 
H25
H71
J60
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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