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dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-06-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:23Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25808-
dc.description.abstractBusiness groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected to each other by a vertical production structure and an internal capital market. Thus, the business group's organizational mode and the financial structure allow a self-enforcing contract to be designed. Our model of a business group shows that only sequential investments can solve the ex post moral hazard problem. We also find that firms may prefer not to integrate.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1763en
dc.subject.jelG31en
dc.subject.jelG32en
dc.subject.jelG34en
dc.subject.jelK49en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwKonzernen
dc.subject.stwVertragen
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwMarktversagenen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleBusiness groups in emerging markets: financial control and sequential investment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn517021684en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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