Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25808
Authors: 
Hainz, Christa
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 1763
Abstract: 
Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected to each other by a vertical production structure and an internal capital market. Thus, the business group's organizational mode and the financial structure allow a self-enforcing contract to be designed. Our model of a business group shows that only sequential investments can solve the ex post moral hazard problem. We also find that firms may prefer not to integrate.
JEL: 
G31
G32
G34
K49
L22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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