Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25709 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2008,021
Publisher: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Abstract: 
Deviations from equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies (see Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) or correct expectations but small (perhaps quantal-response) mistakes in best replies (see Goeree et al., 2002). To distinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies. We extensively test the internal validity of this setup. We find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be due to wrong expectations but due to deviations from a best reply.
Subjects: 
Experiments
Auction
Expectations
JEL: 
C92
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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