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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2008,011
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesn’t exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We find that on the aggregate level the proposer’s decision has no effect on acceptance thresholds. However, if the proposer excludes one responder, the distribution of thresholds becomes bimodal, indicating a polarization in behavior.
Schlagwörter: 
bargaining
experiment
labor markets
JEL: 
C91
J52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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