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dc.contributor.authorFreytag, Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Friedrich G.en
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:35Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:35Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25640-
dc.description.abstractCentral bank independence (CBI) is a very important precondition for price stability. However, the empirical evidence for a correlation between both is relatively weak. In this paper, this weakness is countered with a) an extended measure of monetary commitment, which includes well-known criteria for CBI and external criteria such as convertibility and exchange rate regimes and b) the argument that monetary commitment can grant price stability best if it is backed by an adequate assignment of economic policy. An empirical assessment with data from four decades confirms the crucial role of monetary commitment for price stability.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,002en
dc.subject.jelE50en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank independenceen
dc.subject.keywordprice stabilityen
dc.subject.keywordmonetary commitmenten
dc.subject.stwPreisniveaustabilitäten
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen
dc.subject.stwInflationen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwOECD-Staatenen
dc.titleMonetary commitment, institutional constraints and inflation: empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1970s-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn547198434en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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