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dc.contributor.authorLevati, Maria Vittoriaen
dc.contributor.authorPloner, Matteoen
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25633-
dc.description.abstractWe use a two-person public goods experiment to distinguish between effciency and fairness as possible motivations for cooperative behavior. Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the high-productivity player to increase group payoffs when contributing positive amounts. Asymmetric contributions, however, yield unequal individual payoffs. To assess a priori cooperative preferences, we measure individual `value-orientations' by means of the decomposed game technique. Overall, our results indicate that fairness (or inequality aversion) is more in°uential than efficiency in driving behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,067en
dc.subject.jelA13en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic goods experimentsen
dc.subject.keywordConditional cooperationen
dc.subject.keywordFairnessen
dc.subject.keywordEffciencyen
dc.subject.keywordValue orientationsen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwKooperationen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen
dc.titleAre cooperators efficiency- or fair-minded?: evidence from a public goods experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn54718719Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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