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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2008,071
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome a blockade. They have the advantage that urgent decisions are no longer delayed, and the disadvantage that unsuccessful governments gain additional time in office. This may give rise to a time inconsistency. Voters are in favour of a constitution without early elections. However, in the middle of a political crisis, they are willing to abandon it.
Schlagwörter: 
Early elections
political blockades
ideological rigidities
JEL: 
D72
D61
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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