Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25181 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2007,009
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Trade unions are consistently found to compress the wage distribution. Moreover, unemployment affects in particular low-skilled workers. The present paper argues that an extended Right-to-Manage model can account for both of these findings. In this model unions compress the wage distribution by raising wages of workers in low productivity industries (or low-skilled workers) above market clearing levels. Our analysis suggests that the most direct way to test this model would be via a test for stochastic dominance. We also allow for capital adjustments and compare union and non-union wage distributions in a general equilibrium framework.
Schlagwörter: 
Trade unions
wage compression
JEL: 
J51
J31
J41
J21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
589.64 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.