Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25092 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2006,009
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We use a static framework characterized by both moral hazard and holdup problems. In the model the optimal allocation of bargaining power balances these frictions. We examine the impact of improved monitoring on that optimal allocation and its impact upon effort, investment, profits and rents. The model's predictions are consistent with the recent evolution of labor shares, wages per efficiency units and the ratio of labor in efficiency units to capital in several OECD countries. The model suggests further that improvement in monitoring may also play a key role in understanding opposition to institutional reforms in the labor market.
Schlagwörter: 
moral hazard
hold up
bargaining
labor share
JEL: 
D02
D24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
455.43 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.