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dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen
dc.date.accessioned2005-10-26-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:43:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:43:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25050-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2005,041en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelH57en
dc.subject.jelL15en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinnovation contesten
dc.subject.keywordauctionen
dc.subject.keywordtournamenten
dc.subject.keywordqualityen
dc.titleFixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn501723919en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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