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dc.contributor.authorBoockmann, Bernharden
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T15:12:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T15:12:08Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24767-
dc.description.abstractIn this empirical paper, we look at individual voting behaviour of government delegates to the International Labour Organization (ILO). We distinguish between the instrumental motive for voting, which consists in the chance that one´s vote may turn the balance in favour of one´s preferred outcome, and non-instrumental motives, such as a desire for good reputation. Empirically, the two can be identified because two alternatives, abstaining and not participating in the vote, do not differ in their instrumental value, but are likely to differ with respect to reputation aspects. The model is estimated by a multinomial logit with country-specific unobserved heteroge-neity, using roll-call votes on the final passage of ILO conventions from 1977 to 1995. The hypothesis that voting is only instrumental is clearly rejected by the data.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x02-40en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordVotingen
dc.subject.keyworddiscrete choiceen
dc.subject.keywordinternational labour standardsen
dc.subject.keywordILOen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Sozialstandardsen
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungen
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.subject.stwInternational Labour Organisationen
dc.titleMixed motives: an empirical analysis of ILO roll-call votes-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn725693533en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:858en

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