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dc.contributor.authorWölfing, Nikolasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T15:09:27Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T15:09:27Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24736-
dc.description.abstractIn January 2007, first evidence of an asymmetric pass-through of CO2 emission allowance prices was reported for the German electricity spot market. This paper explores the theoretical basis for such an asymmetry in the context of a supply function bidding duopoly. It interprets fluctuating carbon prices as a coordination mechanism for tacitly colluding firms and studies incentive compatibility in the repeated game. It is new in its attempt to model asymmetric behaviour in a spot market without relevant frictions, and gives a reasoning why the asymmetry shows up for emission allowances only. The paper concludes with a theorem: that asymmetric price transmission is sustained up to a certain maximum level which might include the monopoly solution and that this mechanism is always preferred to non-cooperation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x08-040en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelQ41en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric price transmissionen
dc.subject.keywordElectricity spot marketsen
dc.subject.keywordEmission allowancesen
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen
dc.subject.stwPreisen
dc.subject.stwStromtarifen
dc.subject.stwWarenbörseen
dc.subject.stwWertpapierhandelen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleAsymmetric Price Transmission in Supply Function Equilibrium, Carbon Prices and the German Electricity Spot Market-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn570408814en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:7346en

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