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Title:Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe: empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK PDF Logo
Authors:Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle
Köke, Jens
Renneboog, Luc
Issue Date:2001
Series/Report no.:ZEW Discussion Papers 01-24
Abstract:This study examines managerial disciplining in poorly performing firms using large panels for Belgian, French, German and UK firms. We consider the monitoring role of large blockholders, the market for share blocks, creditors, and non-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to poor performance, but not for France. Neither existing blockholders nor creditors play an active role in disciplining. Block purchases have a monitoring role in Belgium and Germany, but not in France and the UK. Large boards facilitate disciplining, but the role of non-executives is ambiguous.
Subjects:corporate governance
managerial disciplining
ownership structure
CEO succession
JEL:G32
G3
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW
ZEW Discussion Papers

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