Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24444
Authors: 
Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle
Köke, Jens
Renneboog, Luc
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 01-24
Abstract: 
This study examines managerial disciplining in poorly performing firms using large panels for Belgian, French, German and UK firms. We consider the monitoring role of large blockholders, the market for share blocks, creditors, and non-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to poor performance, but not for France. Neither existing blockholders nor creditors play an active role in disciplining. Block purchases have a monitoring role in Belgium and Germany, but not in France and the UK. Large boards facilitate disciplining, but the role of non-executives is ambiguous.
Subjects: 
corporate governance
managerial disciplining
ownership structure
CEO succession
JEL: 
G32
G3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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