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dc.contributor.authorHeinemann, Friedrichen
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:50:29Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:50:29Z-
dc.date.issued1998-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24255-
dc.description.abstractWithin the economic profession, it is a widely held view that the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht treaty are arbitrary numbers without economic foundation. Much of this criticism seems to overlook an important aspect - the strategic dimension of the criteria. This paper focuses on one particular question out of this broad strategic complex: How do the criteria change the fiscal bargaining situation on the national level? For this purpose, a bargaining game between a national finance minister and an interest group over budget consolidation is designed. The purpose of this paper is twofold : On the one hand the analysis should contribute to a better understanding of the strategic effects of the fiscal criteria in the pre-EMU period. On the other hand it is to provide insights helpful for the construction of credible and strategically consistent debt limits in the time after the introduction of the Euro.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x98-01en
dc.subject.jelH60en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Monetary Unionen
dc.subject.keywordConvergence Criteriaen
dc.subject.keywordBudget Consolidationen
dc.subject.keywordBoundaryen
dc.subject.keywordSignallingen
dc.subject.keywordConditionalityen
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen
dc.subject.stwHaushaltskonsolidierungen
dc.subject.stwKonvergenzkriterienen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe EMU Consolidation Game - or: Does 3.0 Really Mean 3.0?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn852466617en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:5176en

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