Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23835 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Otto-Wolff-Discussion Paper No. 2004,02
Verlag: 
Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung (owiwo), Köln
Zusammenfassung: 
In the present paper the effects of different pay-as-you-go pension systems on fertility decisions of a representative household are examined. Thereby, the analysis focuses especially on the interplay of parental quantity and quality decisions, introduced by Becker (1960). As it will be shown, a traditional pay-as-you-go system in either case distorts decisions of parents leading to an erosion of the financial basis of the system. In contrast, the assessment of a child-related pay-as-you-go system is ambiguous. If parents are solely responsible for expenditures on the quality of children, it is inefficient, too. However, if it is combined with a device like public education, optimality can be restored.
Schlagwörter: 
Pay-as-you-go
child-related pension
quantity and quality of children
JEL: 
D10
H55
I20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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