Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23812 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorKritikos, Alexander S.en
dc.contributor.authorTan, Jonathan H. W.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-30T12:03:05Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-30T12:03:05Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23812-
dc.description.abstractHow can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), if payment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is by itself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent the first half as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half upon delivery of the service. This contract design is known as "indenture". It is self-enforcing and incentive-compatible. This paper experimentally tests the efficacy of the "indenture game" and its implications for cooperation in oneshot environments. We find that cooperation rates are high and stable over time. Its efficacy is moderated by expected losses due to the existence of uncooperative types.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aEuropean University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics |cFrankfurt (Oder)en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x241en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen
dc.subject.keywordExperimenten
dc.subject.keywordContractsen
dc.subject.keywordIndentureen
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwExperimenten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleIndenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500818169en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:euvwdp:241en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.