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dc.contributor.authorZimmermann, Klaus W.en
dc.contributor.authorDluhosch, Barbaraen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:34:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:34:42Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-17134en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23707-
dc.description.abstractPrevious studies were plagued with considerable problems when interpreting and empirically analysing Wagner's Law. Therefore, we initially present some kind of "pure theory of government's share" for a two-person society based on the pure theory of public and private goods as originally developed by Samuelson. We show that Wagner's regime of a representative and authoritative individual and collective decision making – la Samuelson imply different government shares in GNP, though, in principle, Wagner's outcome can be generated even in a Samuelsonian context. Generalizing our results to an n-person society, we derive "optimal" government shares by use of various variants of the model, however, with very different distributional consequences.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHelmut-Schmidt-Universität - Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre |cHamburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionspapier |x58en
dc.subject.jelH50en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelD11en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordWagner´ s Lawen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordbudget-to GNP-ratioen
dc.titleZur Anatomie der Staatsquote-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn534683452en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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