Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23467 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorSpiegel, Yossien
dc.contributor.authorGilo, Daviden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:07:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:07:46Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23467-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in rivals. In general, the incentives of firms to collude depend in a complex way on the whole set of partial cross ownership (PCO) in the industry. We show that when firms are identical, only multilateral PCO may (but need not) facilitate tacit collusion. A firm?s controller can facilitate tacit collusion further by investing directly in rival firms and by diluting his stake in his own firm. In the presence of cost asymmetries, even unilateral PCO by efficient firms in a less efficient rival can facilitate tacit collusion.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO) |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSIO Working Paper |x0038en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelL41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpartial cross ownershipen
dc.subject.keywordrepeated Bertrand oligopolyen
dc.subject.keywordtacit collusionen
dc.subject.keywordcontrolling shareholderen
dc.subject.keywordcost asymmetriesen
dc.subject.stwKartellen
dc.subject.stwKapitalbeteiligungen
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen
dc.titlePartial cross ownership and tacit collusion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn394159268en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
436.83 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.