Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23397 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Claremont Colleges Working Papers No. 2004-10
Verlag: 
Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics, Claremont, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper the sequence of winning bids in the public auction of used cars in New Jersey is examined for the presence of price anomalies. Unlike many studies of heterogeneous objects where the effect of the order of sale on the price may not be credibly identified, the effect of the order is identified here because the items are randomly selected for sale. In a further contrast to many other studies, these data indicate that the prices tend to increase as the auction proceeds. The data also indicate that once several items have been sold, there is no change in the bidding behavior or further increase in prices.
Schlagwörter: 
Auction
Declining Price Anomaly
JEL: 
C81
D44
C93
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
415.06 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.