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Title:Promises made, promises broken : a model of IMF program implementation PDF Logo
Authors:Joyce, Joseph P.
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:Working Papers / Wellesley College, Department of Economics 2003,03
Abstract:This paper presents a model of the implementation of IMF programs, which is empirically tested with data from the period 1975-99. The IMF and the borrowing country are shown to have asymmetric evaluations of a program?s discounted benefits, due to differences in the measurement of the benefits, the relevant time frame and appropriate discount rate. The model also distinguishes between a government that seeks to maximize national welfare and an autocracy that seeks only to benefit the ruling group. The results of the empirical analysis demonstrate that program implementation is affected by a country?s trade openness, the ideological cohesion of the government, the duration of the political regime, and the degree of political openness.
Subjects:IMF programs
conditionality
JEL:F33
O19
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Wellesley College

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