Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23219 
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Wellesley College Working Paper No. 2003-01
Publisher: 
Wellesley College, Department of Economics, Wellesley, MA
Abstract: 
We adopt an inter-generational approach to the public goods game where at the end of each session subjects are allowed to leave advice for the succeeding generation via free form messages. We find that a process of social learning via passing advice from one generation to the next helps increase contributions over time and also mitigates problems of free riding.
JEL: 
C92
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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