Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23127 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper No. 2002-13
Verlag: 
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE), Saarbrücken
Zusammenfassung: 
In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).
Schlagwörter: 
European Union
comitology
principal-agent-relationship
structure-induced agent discretion
JEL: 
K1
D72
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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