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Title:European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue PDF Logo
Authors:Schmidtchen, Dieter
Steunenberg, Bernard
Issue Date:2002
Series/Report no.:CSLE Discussion Paper 2002-13
Abstract:In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).
Subjects:European Union
comitology
principal-agent-relationship
structure-induced agent discretion
JEL:K1
D72
C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes

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