Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23053 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper No. 97-01
Verlag: 
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE), Saarbrücken
Zusammenfassung: 
Even if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax morale". Our paper models tax payers as imperfect decision-makers and explains deviations from the optimal solution by making use of a weaker assumption: The imperfect tax payer's decision to deviate from a given rule depends on their competence and on the complexity of their situation.
Schlagwörter: 
tax compliance
bounded rationality
imperfect decision-making
detection skill
rule-governed behavior
JEL: 
H26
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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