Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22963 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 18/2006
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
There is much evidence against the so-called "too big to fail" hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.
Schlagwörter: 
bailouts
soft-budget constraints
jurisdictional size
public goods
spillovers
JEL: 
H4
H7
R1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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