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dc.contributor.authorKranz, Sebastianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:22Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22956-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses competition of moral norms and institutions in a society where a fixed share of people unconditionally complies with norms and the remaining people act selfishly. Whether a person is a norm-complier or selfish is private knowledge. A model of voting-by-feet shows that those norms and institutions arise that maximize expected utility of norm-compliers, taken into account selfish players' behavior. Such complier optimal norms lead to a simple behavioral model that, when combined with preferences for equitable outcomes, is in line with the relevant stylized facts from a wide range of economic experiments, like reciprocal behavior, costly punishment, the role of intentions, giving in dictator games and concerns for social efficiency. The paper contributes to the literature on voting-by-feet, institutional design, ethics and social preferences.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x11/2006en
dc.subject.jelD02en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.jelA13en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelZ13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmoral normsen
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen
dc.subject.keywordrule utilitarianismen
dc.subject.keywordvoting-by-feeten
dc.subject.keywordcultural evolutionen
dc.subject.keywordgolden ruleen
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen
dc.titleMoral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn514470046en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:112006-

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